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IN THE SUP·REME CO·URT
OF THE s.TATE OF UTAH
OLSON CONSTRUCTION COMpANY, THIOKOL CHEMICAL
CORPORATION, Utah Division; EMPIRE STEEL COMpANY and FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS COMPANY,
Petitioners,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9362

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As indicated in petitioners' Brief, the facts in this
case are undisputed and were submitted to the Tax Commission upon a written stipulation (R-6).
Thiokol Chemical Corporation holds a prime contract
with the United States Government for the construction
of certain facilities near Brigham City, Utah. Thiokol
awarded two sub-contracts to Olson Construction Company for the construction of various buildings and other
1
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facilities, known and described as Minuteman Facilities
Package No. 1 and Minuteman Facilities Package No. 2.
These facilities were constructed by Olson in accordance
with two lump sum construction contracts. Olson contracted and agreed with Thiokol to construct Minuteman
Facilities Package No. 1 for $1,124,965.00 (Exhibits B
and C) ; the lump sum price to construct Minuteman Facilities Package No. 2 was $734,559.00 (Exhibits D
and E).
In the course of fulfilling its sub-contracts, Olson
Construction Company used and consumed building materials which it purchased from various suppliers. Empire Steel Company and Fife Rock Products Company
were two of these suppliers. A sales tax was imposed
upon and paid by Olson on the purchase of the building
materials. A claim for refund of these taxes was made
to the Tax Commission (R-1); the petition was denied
(R-32); and the sole question to be decided on appeal is
whether the sales tax was properly imposed.
No tax has been imposed upon any of the other parties to this litigation; Empire and Fife were merely
collectors of the tax; and Thiokol has joined in the petition because under the terms of its sub-contract it has
reimbursed Olson for the taxes paid.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I

OLSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY WAS
TI-IE USER AND CONSUMER OF THE V AR2
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IOUS BUILDING MATERIALS AND THE
SALES TAX WAS PROPERLY IMPOSED
AND PAID.
PoiNT II
THE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND TO
FOLLOW AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION IF SAID REGULATION IS CONTRARY
TO THE LAW.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT I
OLSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY WAS
THE USER AND CONSUMER OF THE V ARIOUS BUILDING MATERIALS AND THE
SALES TAX WAS PROPERLY IMPOSED
AND PAID.
Appellants in this ease do not claim to be exempt
from sales tax under Section 59-15-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which exempts from taxation all sales to the
U. S. Government. None of the parties involved in this
lawsuit are agents of the U. S. Government and under
the leading Supreme Court cases of Alabama v. King &
Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 and Curry v. United States, 314 U.S.
14, the government exemption cannot be invoked. Rather,
the contention seems to be that the sale of building materials to Olson Construction Company were sales for
resale; that a sale for resale is not a retail sale; and that
the sales tax only applies to retail sales.
It is the position of the Tax Commission that the
sales tax applies to all sales of tangible personal prop3
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erty made to the ultimate consumer of the property purchased, and that Olson Construction Company was the
user and consumer of the materials in question.
Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, imposes a sales tax upon every ''retail sale of
tangible personal property made within the state of
Utah.'' The term ''retail sale'' is defined in Section
59-15-2 (e) as "every sale within the state of Utah by a
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer, except such
sales as are defined as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by the terms of this act''; and the term ''retailer''
is defined in the same section as ''a person doing a regularly organized retail business in tangible personal property, known to the public as such and selling to the user
or con.sumer and not for resale." Section 59-15-2 (d)
defines the term ''wholesale'' to mean ''the sale of tangible personal property by wholesalers to retail merchants, jobbers, dealers, or other wholesalers for resale,
and does not include a sale by wholesalers or retailers to
users or consumers not for resale, except as otherwise
hereinafter specified.
The question as to whether a contractor is a user or
consumer and thus liable for sales tax on the purchase
of building materials has already been clearly decided
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Utah Concrete
Products Corporation v. State Ta.x Co1nmission, 101 Utah
513, 125 P. 2d 408. As in the case presently before the
Court, that case involved the sale of products made by a
manufacturer of building materials to contractors for
4
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use upon a public construction contract. Because this
case is directly in point, we quote at length from the
language of the Court :
"It is the plaintiff's position that a sale by them
as manufacturers to contractors for use in private
and public construction is not a 'retail sale' within the contemplation of the act. The defendant Tax
Commission contends that by the provisions of the
act it is 'apparent that the sales tax applies to the
sale to the ultimate ''user or consumer.'' '
Under paragraph (e), Section 2, Chapter 20, Laws
of Utah, Second Special Session, 1933, as amended
by Laws 1939 c. 103, amending the original act of
1933, it states the term 'retailer' to mean
'a person doing a regularly organized retail business in tangible personal property, known to the
public as such and selling to the user or consumer
and not for resale, and includes commission merchants and all persons regularly engaged in the
business of selling to users or consumers within
the state of Utah * * * The term ''retail sale''
means every sale within the state of Utah by a
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer, except such sales as are defined as wholesale sales
or otherwise exempted by the terms of this act
* * *.' (Emphasis by the Court)
*
* *
From the context of our statute 'used' and 'consumed' may be said to express the same meaningto make use of, to employ, and does not necessarily
mean the immediate destruction or extermination
or change in form of the article or commodity.
The paramount question then turns upon the proposition of whether the contractors to whom the
plaintiffs sold their products were 'users' or 'consumers' within the meaning of the act or whether

5
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they were mere dealers in the products reselling
to the third parties.
*
* *
... in the instant case, contractors purchase the
pipes, culverts and cinder blocks for the purpose
of using and consuming them by incorporating
them as one of many units which go to make up
buildings, structures, or roads, as the case might
be, and not for reselling them as such in their original form, but for the purpose of changing their
very nature from personal to real property. In
short, labor and many other materials enter along
with the plaintiffs' products to make up the particular structure, and they are all used or consumed in the process of producing a new entity...
In the case of the City of St. Louis v. Smith, 342
Mo. 317, 114 S.W. 2d 1017, 1019, under a retail
sales statute similar in intent and wording to ours,
building, paving and sewer contractors were held
liable for the tax as 'consumers,' and it was the
dealer's duty to collect the tax at time of sale. The
court stated that in its 'judgment the contractors
in this case did not buy the materials in question
for the purpose of reselling such materials to the
city. They were under contract to deliver to the
city a finished product. It was the inseparable
comingling of labor and material that produced
the finished product.'
Again in the case of .Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell,
212 N.C. 624, 194 S.E. 117, 118, the court on holding plumbing and heating contractors subject to
sales tax law, stated that
'they purchase the materials and supplies, not for
resale as tangible personal property, but for use in
producing the turnkey job. There is no resale of
the materials and supplies, as such, either actual
or intended, within the meaning of the act.' See
views expressed to the same effect in Lone Star
6
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Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 234 Ala.
465, 173 So. 399; Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 42 N.M. 58, 75 P. 2d 334; State v.
J. lVatts Kearney & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77;
I-I erlihy JVlid-Continent Co. v. Nudelma'n, 367 Ill.
600, 12 N.E. 2d 638, 115 A.L.R. 491.''
Thus, it was held that contractors are consumers within
the meaning of the Sales Tax Act.
The only difference between the Utah Concrete Products case and the instant case is the fact that here there
exists a provision in the contract reciting that title to all
property purchased by the contractor shall pass to and
vest in the government immediately upon delivery to the
site. The government was not even a party to this contract. It would seem unreasonable to believe that the
Sales Tax Act could be completely circumvented by the
simple insertion of this clause in the construction contract between Thiokol Chemical Corporation and Olson
Construction Company.
The above is especially true when the nature of the
contract is carefully examined. Thiokol did not contract
with Olson for the purchase of a load of lumber, a pile
of bricks, or a keg of nails; on the contrary, they were
only interested in contracting for the construction of a
complete facility. This is clearly evident by the Statement of Work as provided at page 1 of the basic contracts
(Exhibits Band D):

"Contractor agrees to furnish all plant, labor and
materials, equipment and supplies and to perform
all operations in connection with the construction
7
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. of a complete facility as indicated in the Cost
Schedule of Bid Items, in strict accordance with
the specifications, schedules, drawings and conditions.'' (emphasis supplied)

That Thiokol or the United States Government did
not in reality repurchase from Olson the building materials as such is further evidenced by the fact that acceptance of the completed facility was subject to inspection
(Clause 9 of General Conditions of Contract, Exhibits C
and E) ; and also that Olson had the sole responsibility for
all materials upon which payments had been received and
the responsibility for restoration of all damaged work
(Clause 7 (c) of General Conditions of Contract, Exhibits
C and E).
From a realistic standpoint, Olson Construction
Company performed and completed its construction contract in the same customary manner as any other contractor. Because of such facts, Olson cannot he considered
as a wholesaler of building supplies which it used and
consumed in the performance of its contract and which
were never at any time used or consumed by either Thiokol Chemical Corporation or the United States Government.
Appellants have cited two Connecticut cases in support of their position. These cases, however, involve the
interpretation of Connecticut statutes, which are entirely different from the Utah Sales Tax Act. The Counecticut Act does not necessarily impose the tax upon the
user or consumer as does the Utah Tax Law. It seems
8
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('ll'nr from the definitions in the statute and from the

Utah Concrete Products case, previously referred to, that
under the Utah Law the legislative intent was to impose
a sales tax upon all sales of tangible personal property
made to the consumer or user of said property.

POINT

II

TI-IE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT BOUND TO
FOLLOW AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION IF SAID REGULATION IS CONTRARY
TO THE LAW.
As the Petitioners have pointed out in their brief, it
is true that under Sales Tax Regulation 58, as it was
originally promulgated, Olson Construction Company
':vTould be considered a purchaser for resale and thus not
subject to the Sales Tax Act. However, it is apparent
from the provisions of the Act and the Utah Cone rete
Produ.cts case previously cited, that such regulation had
no legal basis and was completely contrary to the law.
It is no doubt embarrassing to the State Tax Commission to have to admit an error and amend a published
regulation. It further cannot be argued that such policy
makes for good public relations. The error was certainly unfortunate for all concerned. However, when the matter was brought to the attention of the Commission there
was no other alternative but to recognize the mistake and
take immediate steps to correct it. The regulation was,
therefore, amended July 1, 1959, to conform to the law.
The Commission not only had the power but it had the
duty to rectify its error.
9
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Section 59-15-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, gives
the State Tax Commission power to prescribe rules and
regulations only so long as they are ''in conformity with
this Act.'' This point was stressed in the case of Western
Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 Utah
227, 48 P. 2d 526, where it was stated by the Utah Supreme Court that the legislative power to determine who
is or is not to be taxed is vested in the Legislature and the
people of the State of Utah, and not in the Tax Commission. To put it in the language of the court, "The
Commission is empowered merely to make rules and regulations, etc., in conformity with the Act.'' If the authorization to make rules and regulations were to go beyond
this, such would constitute an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power. In other words, the Tax Commission has no power to change the legislative intention. It
was further stated in the case of Utah Concrete Products
Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125
P. 2d 408, that ''Governmental agencies cannot deprive
the Courts of their judicial functions, nor can the agencies extend the operation of the statute by administrative
regulations.''
The case of Howard Pore Inc. v. Nims, State Commissioner of Revenue, 33 N.W. 2d 657, decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involved changes made in an administrative regulation. There, the court held as follows:
''the liability for the payment of taxes, and the
determination of the amount thereof, depend on
the statute. Such liability may not be imposed by
rules or regulations of the department. (citation)
10
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By the same process of reasoning, liability for a
tax imposed by statute may not be obviated by
administrative action on the part of those charged
with enforcing the law. . . . Administrative interpretation is not binding on the court and must
be rejected if not in accord with the intent of the
legislature.''
In Peoples Gas & Electric Co. v. State Tax Commission, 28 N.W. 2d 799 (Iowa), it was stated that "although
stability in such rules and regulations is desirable it does
not follow that they may not be changed or corrected by
the Commission.''
In Mercha(fl,ts Nation.al Bank v. Com.mission.er of Jn,ternal Revenue, 199 F. 2d 657 it was held that "the Commissioner has the power to overrule or modify a subordinate ruling, or even his own if he considers it unsound."
And in National Labor Relations Boa.rd v. National
Container Corp., 211 F. 2d 525, it was stated that reliance
upon a Board rule will not estop the Board from applying
a new rule in an appropriate case where the application
of the new rule will effectuate the purpose of the Act.
Petitioners have cited cases holding that a regulation
cannot be applied retroactively. None of these cases, however, involve a regulation which was void or inoperative
from the beginning because of being contrary to the law.
The cases are not in point.
Petitioners' brief further gives the impression that
they relied upon the early regulation to their detriment.
The facts, however, do not bear this out. Petitioners
Fife Rock Products Company and Empire Steel Com11
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pany were not hurt because they collected the tax from
Olson and paid it to the State Tax Commission. Olson
Construction Company is not hurt because Thiokol reimbursed them for all taxes paid pursuant to their contract.
And Thiokol is not hurt because under their prime contract with the United States Government, they are entitled
to be reimbursed for all direct and indirect costs in connection with the construction of the facility.
Further, under the old regulation, a contractor
claiming to be exempt was required to obtain a Sales
Tax License and secure a clearance with the State Tax
Commission prior to making any purchases. Olson did
not obtain the necessary clearance as contemplated by
the regulation and later when they attempted to do so
the same was denied (R. 7 and 8). It would seem unreasonable to permit Olson to claim benefit of a regulation
to which they themselves did not comply.
None of the Petitioners suffered any damage as a
result of the Tax Commission's amendment to Sales Tax
Regulation 58.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
Tax Commission should be affirmed and that petitioners'
claim for refund should be denied.
Respectully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General
DAVID E. WEST,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

